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Abstract
This study investigates real wage cyclicality in Portugal for the years
of1986-98,addressingtheheterogeneityinwagesresponsestoaggregate
labor market conditions for workers￿hirings and separations. The results
exhibit a moderate procyclical behavior of real wages for continuously
employed workers, in particular, for job stayers. For workers￿accessions a
strongly procyclical behavior in wages was observed, which is consistent
with the idea that entry wages are much more procyclical than current
wages. This empirical evidence suggests that even micro-data estimates
of real wage cyclicality may conceal a strong procyclical wage behavior,
when heterogeneity on wages responses to aggregate conditions between
employed workers and hirings and separations is not taken into account.
JEL classi￿cation: D21; J30; J31
Keywords: wage cyclicality; hirings; separations
1 Introduction
The cyclical behavior of real wages has been the subject of a large number of
studies since the debate of Keynes (1939), Dunlop (1938), and Tarshis (1939).
However, despite considerable research on this issue, the same vexed questions
remain to be solved. Are real wages countercyclical or procyclical? Flexible
price-aggregate demand models predict that real wages should move counter-
cyclically as employment adjusts along a negatively sloped aggregate demand
for labor schedule. Real business cycle models, on the other hand, predict pro-
cyclical movements as workers substitute work for leisure along dynamic labor
supply schedules.
Brandolini (1995) presents an exhaustive literature review of the studies on
real wage cyclicality published from the 1920s onwards. Abraham and Halti-
wanger (1995) also present a review of the empirical evidence on real wage
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1cyclicality, stressing the issue of the sensitivity of the results to the measure-
ment of nominal wages, nominal prices, and cyclical conditions, as well as to
frequency, time period, and econometric speci￿cation.
The studies based on aggregate data show some ambiguous results. In this
case, the best conclusion is that the choice of the time period analysis, price
de￿ ator, and cyclical indicator, as well as the choice between wage rates and
average earnings (including overtime or not), may substantially a⁄ect the esti-
mates of real wage cyclicality [Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995)].
One reason why these studies have reached no de￿nitive conclusions resides
in the fact that they have been performed at the aggregate level. In particular,
they have ignored the changes in the composition of the workforce over the cycle.
The presence of compositional e⁄ects has attracted much attention in the last
years and recent micro-data studies based on panel data for the U.S. showed
that composition bias plays an important role on real wage behavior along the
business cycle [see, for example, Mitchell et al. (1985), Bils (1985), Keane et
al. (1988) and Solon et al. (1994)]. In fact, cyclical changes in the composition
of the work force may induce a countercyclical bias in the aggregate real wage.
Aggregate measures of real wages tend to give more weight to low-skill workers
during expansions than during recessions. The argument is that if less-skilled
workers are more vulnerable to layo⁄, they will account for a smaller share of
employment in recessions than in expansions.
As stated in Blundell et al. (2000), ￿Aggregate ￿gures for real wage growth
are used extensively in policy debate to analyze changes in the well-being of
workers over time and to compare di⁄erent groups of people both within and
across countries. However, if participation (employment) rates change across
time periods or across the groups used in these comparisons, then aggregate
real wages may give a misleading impression of changes in the structure of real
wages facing individual workers.￿ According to them, aggregate real wages are
shown to contain three important bias terms: one that describes the dispersion
of wages, the second re￿ ecting the distribution of working hours, and the third
captures the e⁄ects of composition changes in the selected sample of workers.
Using data from the U.K. Family Expenditure Survey (FES) from 1978 to 1996,
they have shown that those three terms play an important role in explaining
the di⁄erences between individual and aggregate wages in Britain.
An additional general problem of aggregation is that it assumes that the
relationship between real wages and the business cycle is the same for all indi-
viduals or groups of individuals. If wrong, the estimates of real wage cyclicality
include a speci￿cation bias.
In the last two decades, a number of studies based on micro-panel data for
the U.S. found, without exception, robust evidence in favor of a procyclical
behavior of real wages. Recently, the focus of micro-data studies on wage cycli-
cality has been the di⁄erences in individual real wage responses to aggregate
labor market conditions for di⁄erent types of workers classi￿ed by demographic
characteristics, job mobility status, industry, type of payment, etc. The aim of
our own study is to investigate real wage cyclicality in Portugal for the period
1986-98, addressing the issue of heterogeneity in wage responses to aggregate
2labor market conditions for workers￿hirings and separations. For this purpose
a micro-longitudinal panel data obtained from Quadros de Pessoal (QP) will
be used. QP is an annual mandatory employment survey collected by the Por-
tuguese Ministry of Employment. It covers almost all establishments with wage
earners. Reported data cover the establishment itself, the ￿rm and each of its
workers. Since unique identi￿ers are available for both ￿rms and workers, ￿rms
and individuals can be tracked over the sample period. Currently, the data set
collects data on about 250,000 ￿rms and 2,5 million employees.
Our paper is related in at least two distinct ways to the recent micro-data
studies on wage cyclicality. First, it con￿rms the empirical evidence of a pro-
cyclical behavior of real wages, even for a European country which has a very
di⁄erent labor market institutional framework than the U.S. Second, it addresses
the issue of heterogeneity in wage responses to unemployment for workers￿ac-
cessions and separations, showing that examining wage cyclicality of employed
workers without taking into account the ￿ ows of workers into and out of the
workforce may mask the estimates of real wage cyclicality.
This study will be organized as follows. In the next Section a brief literature
review of previous research on real wage behavior over the business cycle is
presented. In Section 3 some selected labor market indicators for Portugal
are reported. In Section 4 the data set and methodology are described. The
empirical framework and main results are discussed in Section 5. Conclusions
are outlined in Section 6.
2 Previous Research
In this section a very brief description of the empirical literature on the move-
ments of real wages over the cycle will be made.1 These empirical studies can
be classi￿ed in two groups, according to whether aggregate or micro-panel data
are used.
2.1 Studies using Aggregate Data
Over the last 60 years economists have been discussing real wage behavior over
the cycles. Neoclassical and Keynesian models predicted that real wages be-
have countercyclically, since an increase in employment can only occur with a
decrease in real wages.2 However, in the presence of imperfect competition,
uncertainty, lagged responses, or contracting between ￿rms and workers, there
are few reasons to expect this behavior [Brandolini (1995)]. The macroeconomic
disequilibrium model of Barro and Grossman (1971), for instance, provided a
1For a insightful survey see Brandolini (1995).
2Quoting the General Theory [Keynes (1936), p. 17]: ￿ ...with a given organization,
equipment and technique, real wages and the volume of output (and hence of employment)
are uniquely correlated, so that, in general, an increase in employment can only occur to the
accompaniment of a decline in the rate of real wages. Thus I am not disputing this vital fact
which the classical economists have (rightly) asserted as indefeasible. ...The real wage earned
by a unit of labor has a unique inverse correlation with the volume of employment.￿
3theoretical explanation for the possibility of procyclical real wages. They show
that the impact of excess supply of commodities on labor demand removes the
one-to-one classical relationship between real wage and employment. In a gen-
eral disequilibrium situation, unemployment can coexist with ￿non-excessive￿
real wages, and a procyclical pattern of real wages is consistent with the theoret-
ical model. On the other hand, implicit contract theory predicts the existence
of acyclical real wages [see Rosen (1985) for a survey]. According to this theory,
contract wages embody implicit payments of insurance premiums by workers in
favorable states of nature and receipt indemnities in unfavorable states, meaning
that wages are somewhat insulated from current labor market conditions.
The empirical work tried to shed some light on these alternative explana-
tions. In fact, it is worth noting that the establishment of a stylized fact con-
cerning the typical wage pattern over the cycle is purely an empirical matter.
Several studies using aggregate data appeared in the 1970s and 1980s with
the aim of analyzing the movements of real wages over the business cycle. The
focus of these studies was the raw correlation between real wages and employ-
ment or output (or another cyclical indicator). In this sense, real wages are
acyclical when they are uncorrelated with the variable chosen as indicator of
the business cycle.
Despite the use of appropriate econometric techniques and representative
data sets, the conclusions reported in these studies were mixed and inconclusive.
Indeed, studies by Chirinko (1980), Canzoneri (1978), Tatom (1980), Neftci
(1978), Sargent (1978), and Mehra (1982) provide evidence of countercyclical
real wages. However, Bodkin (1969) and Michie (1987) showed that real wages
are procyclical. On their side, Geary and Kennan (1982) found evidence for 12
OECD countries in favor of the hypothesis that real wages and employment are
statistically independent. Finally, Sumner and Silver (1989) concluded that real
wages were either procyclical or countercyclical depending on the sample period
chosen.
Table 1 displays a selected number of studies on real wage cyclicality based
on aggegated data and the main results obtained concerning the correlation
between real wages and the cyclical indicator.
4Table 1: Studies of Real Wage Cyclicality that Use Aggregate Data
Cyclical Real Wage/Cyclical Indicator
Author Country Sample Indicator Correlation Remarks
Bodkin (1969) U.S. Manufacturing data Unemployment negative, signiﬁcant
quarterly (annual); 1900-65 rate
Canada Manufacturing data Unemployment not signiﬁcant
quarterly (annual); 1921-65 rate
Otani (1978) 14 Industrial Manufacturing data Index of industrial negative, signiﬁcant in 6 of
countries annual; 1952-75 production the 14 countries
Chirinko (1980) U.S. Manufacturing data Index of industrial negative, signiﬁcant account for compositional
annual; 1955-75 production changes in the workforce
Canzoneri (1978) Canada Manufacturing data Worked hours negative, signiﬁcant account for the level
quarterly; 1954-70 per capital unit of capital stock
Tatom (1980) U.S. Private business sector Worked hours negative, signiﬁcant account for the cyclical
annual; 1948-73 per capital unit variation of utilization
of the capital stock
Neftci (1978) U.S. Manufacturing data Production workers negative, signiﬁcant introduced dynamic analysis
monthly; 1948-71 in manufacturing
Sargent (1978) U.S. Manufacturing data Production workers negative, signiﬁcant introduced dynamic analysis
quarterly; 1948-72 in manufacturing
5Table 1: Continued
Cyclical Real Wage/Cyclical Indicator
Author Country Sample Indicator Correlation Remarks
Geary and Kennan (1982) 12 OECD Manufacturing data Employment no correlation aemployment and real wages
countries quarterly; 1947-77 in manufacturing for the 12 countriesa are statistically independent
Sumner and Silver (1989) U.S. Manufacturing data Total employment negative and positive
annual; 1900-85 in manufacturing depending on the sample period
Mehra (1982) U.S. Manufacturing datab Production workers negative, signiﬁcant in 9 of b disaggregated by industry
quarterly; 1956-70 in manufacturing the 14 industries at the two digit level
Burda (1985) U.S. Manufacturing datab Total worked hours inconclusive b disaggregated by industry
annual; 1949-78 at the two digit level
Michie (1987) U.K. Manufacturing datab Industry output positive, signiﬁcant in all b disaggregated by industry
annual; 1948-74 industries except one at the two digit level
62.2 Studies using Micro-data
Empirical studies on real wage movements that use micro-panel data began to
appear in the mid 1980s. The authors of these studies realized that the changes
in the composition of the workforce over the cycle may a⁄ect the behavior of
aggregate wages, inducing a bias. The usual argument is that less skilled workers
are more vulnerable to layo⁄s in a period of recession. Thus, in periods of
business cycle recession real wages are probably averaged over a group of workers
with higher wages than those averaged in a period of business cycle expansion,
imposing a countercyclical bias. Bils (1985) and Mitchell et al. (1985) were the
￿rst to explicitly address the e⁄ects of using aggregate data on the estimates of
real wage cyclicality.
Using two di⁄erent data sets, the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) and
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), these studies point quite deci-
sively toward a procyclical behavior of real wages.3 Concerning the sign of the
composition bias, the results were not so conclusive. Those studies that used
the PSID data concluded that aggregation induces a countercyclical bias. The
studies using the NLS data showed a relatively unimportant countercyclical
composition bias (Bils, 1985) or a procyclical one (Keane et al., 1988).
Recently, the main focus of these studies has been the di⁄erences in indi-
vidual real wage responses to aggregate labor market conditions for di⁄erent
types of workers classi￿ed by demographic characteristics, job mobility status,
industry, type of payment, etc. Solon et al. (1994) and Shin (1994), for exam-
ple, analyzed the heterogeneity in real wage responses over the cycle between
job changers and job stayers. After Bils￿(1985) ￿nding that wages are strongly
procyclical only among job changers, these authors have reported evidence of
considerable real wage procyclicality even for job stayers. Tremblay (1990) and
Solon et al. (1994) analysed the cyclicality of wages by gender, showing that
women￿ s real wage are much less procyclical than men￿ s real wage. Ziliak et
al. (1999) investigate how real wages respond to local and aggregate unemploy-
ment over time for di⁄erent groups of workers classi￿ed according to education,
race, industry, occupation and union status. Overall, they found spatial and
timing di⁄erences in the cyclicality of real wages as well as substantial het-
erogeneity in wage behavior over the cycle across di⁄erent groups of workers.
Grant (2001) compares the cyclical behavior of union and nonunion wages in
the U.S., concluding that substantial reductions in union wage procyclicality
since the mid-1980s are associated with reductions in the procyclical exercise
of bargaining power. Devereux (2001) provides a detailed analysis of the wage
cyclicality of stayers, taking into account the di⁄erent types of payment. Taken
as a whole, his results revealed that incentive pay is much more sensitive to the
business cycle than are wage rates or salaries.
In Tables 2 and 3 a synthesis of the methodology and main empirical results
of the U.S. micro-data studies is provided. Table 2 refers to the studies that
used the NLS data and Table 3 refers to the studies that used the PSID data.
3Meghir and Whitehouse (1996) used data on male employees for the U.K. and also showed
that real wages are highly procyclical.
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National Longitudinal Survey (NLS)
Model and Cyclical Estimates
Author Sample Estimation Method Wage Measure (aggregate unemployment rate)
Bils (1985) young men ﬁrst diﬀerences weekly earnings, including β = −1.59 (whites)
1966-80 (GLS) overtime, divided by weekly hours β = −0.64 (job stayers)
11 spells (GNP deﬂator) β = −3.69 (job changers)
Keane et al. (1988) young men random eﬀects hourly straight-time earnings β = −0.96 (OLS)
1966-81 (maximum likelihood (ML)) (CPI deﬂator) β = −0.66 (ML)
12 spells
Tremblay (1990) young women/men ﬁxed eﬀects hourly wage β = −0.90 (white women)
1968-78 (OLS) (CPI deﬂator) β = −1.5 (white men)
9/8 spells
Shin (1994) young men ﬁrst diﬀerences annual earnings divided by β = −1.65 (whites)
1966-81 (OLS) annual hours β = −1.18 (job stayers)
12 spells (GNP deﬂator) β = −2.67 (job changers)Table 3: Studies of Real Wage Cyclicality that Use Micro-data
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
Model and Cyclical Estimates
Author Sample Estimation Method Wage Measure (aggregate unemployment rate)
Raisian (1983) men aged 65 or less ﬁxed eﬀects total annual labor income excluding β = −0.65∗
1967-79 (OLS) income from extra jobs, divided ∗ industry unemployment rate
13 spells by weeks worked (CPI deﬂator)
Solon et al. (1994) men/women aged 16 plus ﬁrst diﬀerences annual earnings divided β = −1.40 (men)
1967-87 (OLS) by annual hours β = −0.53 (women)
21 spells (GNP deﬂator) β = −1.24 (men stayers)
Ziliak et al. (1999) men aged 20-65 ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) annual earnings divided β = −1.31 (FE)
1971-90 ﬁrst diﬀerences (FD) by annual hours (personal β = −1.15 (FD)
20 spells (OLS) consumption expenditure deﬂator)
Devereux (2001) men aged 18-64 ﬁrst diﬀerences annual earnings divided β = −1.16 (full sample)
1970-91 (OLS) by annual hours (personal β = −0.81 (job stayers)
22 spells consumption expenditure deﬂator) β = −0.54 (job stayers with
no extra jobs)
93 Some Selected Labor Market Indicators4
3.1 Labor Force Participation and Unemployment
Table 4 and Figures 1 and 2 display the evolution of the unemployment and
participation rates over the period 1985-98.5
The national unemployment rate is obtained from the Labor Force Survey
of the Instituto Nacional de Estat￿stica (INE). As can be seen, the period 1985-
98 comprises the 1985-92 expansion and the 1993-96 recession. In fact, the
unemployment rate reached its peak in 1985 at 8.5%. Since then its evolution
has accompanied the economic expansion of the mid-1980s, so that it steadily
decreased until 1992. By this time, the Portuguese labor market experienced
a situation of near full employment. However, due to the recession initiated in
1993, unemployment rates rose, averaging 7.3% in 1996.
In the mid-1980s and the early 1990s the proportion of female unemployment
was much higher than the proportion of male unemployment (see Table 4).
Since then, male and female unemployment shares have been very similar, albeit
slightly higher for women.
Over the 1985-98 period the participation rate seems to exhibit a procyclical
behavior. The evolution of male activity rates over this period is mainly the
result of a declining participation of younger (less than 24 years) and older
(50-64 years) men, and an almost unchanged participation behavior for men
in the 24-50 years group. In its turn, the rise in female participation is the
result of a long-term trend mainly explained by changing life styles and family
strategies concerning participation in the labor market. Portugal exhibits one
of the highest rate of female participation in the labor force in the European
Union.
4In the Annex a brief description of the Portuguese labor market is presented.
5It should be noted that in 1992 and 1998 there is a series break, implying that the results
are not directly comparable with the previous year.
10Figure 1: Unemployment Rate, Portugal 1985-98
Table 4: Unemployment and Participation Rates
Portugal, 1985-98
Unemployment Participation
Rate (%) Rate (%)a
Year All Male Female All Male Female
1985 8.5 6.3 11.4 67.7
1986 8.4 6.5 11.1 67.4
1987 7.1 5.4 9.5 67.6 80.0 55.6
1988 5.7 4.1 8.0 67.9 79.9 56.7
1989 5.0 3.4 7.1 68.3 80.4 57.2
1990 4.7 3.2 6.6 69.0 80.5 58.2
1991 4.1 2.8 5.8 70.3 80.7 60.6
1992* 4.1 3.5 4.9 68.4 78.7 58.9
1993 5.5 4.7 6.5 67.8 77.2 59.0
1994 6.8 6.0 7.8 67.5 76.4 59.3
1995 7.2 6.4 8.0 67.2 75.4 59.4
1996 7.3 6.5 8.2 67.5 75.5 59.9
1997 6.7 6.1 7.6 68.5 76.4 61.1
1998* 5.0 4.0 6.2 70.3 78.6 62.4
Source: INE; * series break.
a Men and women aged 15-64 years.
11Figure 2: Participation Rate, Portugal 1985-98
3.2 Real and Nominal Wages
In Tables 5 and 6 the evolution of nominal and real wages over the 1985-98
period is presented, using data from Quadros de Pessoal (QP). The QP data
set includes all dependent workers, excluding public administration and non-
market services.6 The wages were de￿ ated by the CPI (base=1985).
Table 5 provides information on annual rates of growth of average monthly
base wages and average monthly earnings.7 Portuguese nominal wages and
earnings show an upward trend over the entire period 1985-98. The rates of
growth, however, have decreased in recent years, keeping pace with in￿ ation. In
fact, in the 1990s a great e⁄ort was made by the government and social partners
in order to reduce in￿ ation and obey the convergence criteria of the Euro area
(the ￿gures for the in￿ ation rate are shown in column 1 of Table 7).
According to Table 6, changes in real wages were also positive, except for the
year of 1995. Whereas the 1989 fall in the rate of growth of real earnings was
mainly attributable to a transitory failure in expectations following the setback
in disin￿ ationary policies, the 1994/95 decline stems from the recession that
took place in 1993.
Table 7 provides the rates of change of nominal and real earnings for the
whole economy. The in￿ ation rate as measured by the CPI (excluding rent) for
the mainland is also reported. The evidence for the entire economy displays
essentially the same pattern.
6A detailed description of this data set will be presented in the next Section.
7The average monthly earnings include base wages, seniority payments and regular bene￿ts.
12Table 5: Nominal Monthly Base Wages and Earnings
Portugal, 1985-98
Average Monthly Percentage Average Monthly Percentage
Year Base Wages* Change Earnings* Change
1985 24719.4 27526.2
1986 29811.7 20.6 33239.9 20.8
1987 34242.3 14.9 38332.2 15.3
1988 37550.3 9.7 42341.8 10.5
1989 42582.4 13.4 47955.3 13.3
1990 n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a.
1991 58179.9 n. a. 66319.4 n. a.
1992 66439.7 14.2 76985.1 16.1
1993 73797.4 11.1 84944.2 10.3
1994 80192.8 8.7 92943.5 9.4
1995 82518.4 2.9 95890.5 3.2
1996 87169.6 5.6 101744.6 6.1
1997 90557.7 3.9 106014.9 4.2
1998 94470.0 4.3 110825.1 4.5
Source: QP; 1986-93 March data; 1994-98 October data; n. a.: not available.
* in PTE (escudo): 1 EUR￿200.482 PTE.
Table 6: Real Monthly Base Wages and Earnings
Portugal, 1985-98
Average Monthly Percentage Average Monthly Percentage
Year Base Wages* Change Earnings* Change
1985 24719.4 27526.2
1986 26563.9 7.5 29631.2 7.6
1987 27786.8 4.6 31114.8 5.0
1988 28167.7 1.4 31756.3 2.1
1989 28428.3 0.9 32017.0 0.8
1990 n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a.
1991 30693.8 n. a. 34984.1 n. a.
1992 32297.7 5.2 37409.9 7.0
1993 33420.3 3.5 38472.5 2.8
1994 33761.2 1.0 39134.1 1.7
1995 33360.2 -1.2 38773.2 -0.9
1996 34222.3 2.6 39956.1 3.0
1997 34924.0 2.0 40878.3 2.4
1998 35305.3 1.1 41417.6 1.3
Source: QP; 1986-93 March data; 1994-98 October data; n. a.: not available.
* in PTE (escudo): 1 EUR￿200.482 PTE.
13Table 7: Percentage Changes of Prices and Earnings
Portugal, 1985-98
Consumer Price Index(1) Compensation per employee￿(2)
Annual Nominal Real
Year Percentage Change Percentage Change Percentage Change
1985 19.3
1986 11.7
1987 9.4 13.8 3.8
1988 9.6 11.6 0.7
1989 12.6 14.1 1.2
1990 13.4 17.6 4.9
1991 11.4 19.1 6.6
1992 8.9 13.8 3.9
1993 6.5 8.0 0.8
1994 5.2 5.5 -0.1
1995 4.1 7.1 2.9
1996 3.1 6.5 3.3
1997 2.2 5.8 3.5
1998 2.7 5.8 2.8
Sources: (1) INE; (2) Banco de Portugal (1999), Annual Report 1998.
* Estimates for the entire economy, annual basis. Employers￿contributions
to Social Security included. Private consumption de￿ator.
14The standard measure of wages used in studies of the cyclical behavior of
real wages is an hourly measure. Figure 3 displays the evolution of real hourly
wages and earnings over the period 1985-98 using the QP data. Three mea-
sures of hourly wages were de￿ned: average hourly base wages (AHBW), aver-
age hourly earnings (AHE) and average hourly earnings including overtime pay
(AHEIOT).8
In real terms, average hourly base wages and average hourly earnings (with
or without overtime pay included) exhibit a reasonably steady increase in the
1985-98 period. Between 1985 and 1998, AHE grew around 60% in real terms,
which corresponds to an average annual growth rate of 4% (3.5% for hourly
AHBW). The same is true when overtime pay is included. In fact, average
hourly earnings including overtime pay (AHEIOT) present an evolution pattern
quite similar to AHE. This is mainly due to the fact that in this period overtime
hours represent, on average, only 0.9% of total hours worked, giving rise to an
almost coincidence of values between AHEIOT and AHE.
Figure 4 displays the rates of growth of real and nominal hourly base wages
and earnings. Independently of the wage measure used (base wages or earnings),
real and nominal wage growth rates present a similar pattern over the period
1985-98.
However, when these results are compared to those obtained for monthly
base wages and earnings (see Table 6), some di⁄erences emerge in the evolution
of the rates of growth of real wages and earnings regardless of whether an hourly
or monthly measure is used. In 1994, for example, even though the rate of
growth of real monthly wages and earnings decreased, a reduction in the total
number of usual hours worked contributed to a higher growth in real hourly
wages/earnings.
8AHE equals the ratio of total regular payroll to total normal hours and AHEIOT is de￿ned
as the ratio between total regular payroll including overtime pay and the sum of normal and
extra hours of work. Total regular payroll includes base wages, seniority payments and regular
bene￿ts.
15Figure 3: Real Wages, Portugal 1985-98
Figure 4: Real and Nominal Wage Growth, Portugal 1985-98
164 Data and Methodology
4.1 Data Description
The data sets of this study were constructed using the data from Quadros de
Pessoal (QP). QP is an annual mandatory employment survey collected by the
Portuguese Ministry of Employment, that covers virtually all establishments
with wage earners.9 Indeed, each year every establishment with wage earners
is legally obliged to ￿ll in a standardized questionnaire. Reported data cover
the establishment itself (location, economic activity and employment), the ￿rm
(location, economic activity, employment, sales and legal framework) and each
of its workers (gender, age, education, skill, occupation, tenure, earnings and
duration of work). The information on earnings is very complete. It includes
the base wage (gross pay for normal hours of work), seniority payments, regular
bene￿ts, irregular bene￿ts and overtime pay, as well as the mechanism of wage
bargaining. Information on normal and overtime hours of work is also available.
Twelve spells of QP, from 1986 to 1998, were available for this study.10
From 1986 to 1993 the information was collected in March of each year, and
since 1994, in October.
There are three main reasons that make this survey a good source for the
study of wage cyclicality. The ￿rst is its coverage. By law, the questionnaire
is made available to every worker in a public space of the establishment. This
requirement facilitates the work of the services of the Ministry of Employment
that monitor compliance of ￿rms with the law (e. g., illegal work). Indeed,
the administrative nature of the data and its public availability implies a high
degree of coverage and reliability. Second, this survey is conducted on a yearly
basis, and its identifying scheme allows accurate identi￿cation of workers making
it possible to track them over the years. The workers￿identi￿cation number
is based on a transformation of his/her social security number. Finally, this
source enables the matching of ￿rms and its workers, which allows us to classify
the situation of the worker on the job (stayer/changer, accession/separation).
Each ￿rm entering the database is assigned a unique identifying number and
the Ministry implements several checks to ensure that a ￿rm that has already
reported to the database is not assigned a di⁄erent identi￿cation number.
Naturally, this data source also has its own limitations. The most important
one for the purpose of analyzing wage cyclicality is the short time period covered
(1986-98, excluding 1990).
Table 8 reports information on the number of ￿rms and workers covered by
QP in each year of the 1986-98 period.
9Public administration and non-market services are excluded.
10No computer ￿les are available for the year 1990.
17Table 8: Data Set Coverage
Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-98















Note: n. a. denotes not available.
4.2 Methodology
As explained above, micro-data allow us to avoid the consequences of compo-
sition bias that might contaminate the results when aggregate data are used.
Thus, in order to decompose the e⁄ects of changes in the composition of the
workforce over the cycle and its e⁄ects on real wage cyclicality, four di⁄erent
samples of individuals will be analyzed in this study.
The ￿rst includes all the individuals that are present in every year of the
twelve years surveyed. Since unique identi￿ers are available for each worker, in-
dividuals can be followed over the entire sample period. A separate analysis will
also be made for those workers that never changed employer over all that period
(job stayers). Even though this method of analyzing the exact same workers
from the QP ￿les over the time avoids the problem of composition bias, it does
not avoid the problem of selectivity bias that may arise when wages of ever em-
ployed workers are followed over the cycle. In fact, the population represented
by this sample may experience di⁄erent wage cyclicality than is experienced
by other groups in the labor force, namely those with a lower attachment to
employment/workforce. In order to surpass these selectivity problems, a second
data set that contains the individuals employed for two consecutive years was
also constructed.
Finally, and in order to evaluate heterogeneity in wage responses to aggregate
unemployment between continuously employed workers and hirings and sepa-
rations, two additional data sets were constructed. One that includes newly
hired workers (accessions) and the other that contains recently separated work-
ers (separations). Next we will describe more accurately each of these four
samples.
18As mentioned above, the ￿rst data set contains all the workers that are
present in each and every one of the twelve years surveyed.11 This sample was
restricted to individuals aged between 18 and 52 years old in 1986, excluding
agricultural workers.12 We have also excluded those individuals for whom some
explanatory variable is not available for a particular year, namely those with
no information on wages. In order to minimize the e⁄ects of outliers in wages,
for each wage measure used we dropped 0.5% of the observations corresponding
to the top and bottom tails of the wage distribution. After these exclusions,
a balanced panel of 39,284 men and a balanced panel of 12,926 women was
assembled. Hereinafter, we will call this sample ￿ long-term employee￿ . The
information on the identi￿cation number of the ￿rm allows us to obtain from
this data set a subsample of job stayers, i. e, workers that stayed with the same
employer over the entire period 1986-98 (long-term employee/job stayers). This
subsample is comprised of a balanced panel of 23,809 men and 8,623 women.
The second data set contains a sample of individuals that are present in two
consecutive years.13 This sample was also restricted to individuals aged between
18 and 64 years old, excluding agricultural workers. Those individuals for whom
some explanatory variable is not available for a particular year, as well as the
wages￿outliers, were both excluded from the sample. An unbalanced panel of
170,414 observations on men and 101,750 on women was obtained. We will call
this data set ￿ two-year employee￿ .
The third data set (hereinafter ￿ accessions￿ ) includes a random sample of
individuals that in each year are classi￿ed in the QP data ￿les as a newly hired
worker. A worker is classi￿ed in each year as newly hired if his tenure in that
year is less or equal to one year. We obtained for the 12 pooled cross-sections,
115,009 observations on men and 72,662 on women.14
Finally, the fourth data set (hereinafter ￿ separations￿ ) includes a random
sample of individuals that in each year are classi￿ed as a recently separated
worker. A worker is classi￿ed in each year as recently separated if he (she) is
present in the QP registers in year t but is not present in year t + 1. In order
to control for separations we need to exclude the years of 1989 and 1998. Thus,
this sample is comprised of 10 pooled cross-sections corresponding to 88,994
observations on men and 56,979 on women.15
11When a worker is present in the QP ￿les for more than one time in a given year, the
register in the ￿rm in which he had worked a higher number of hours was selected.
12In agriculture a considerable amount of payments are non-pecuniary. We thought it better
to exclude these workers from the analysis. In any case, the number of these workers is almost
negligible.
13The sample was drawn according to a normal random number generator.
14The same restrictions applied to the sample of two-year employee hold for this sample.
15The same restrictions applied to the sample of two-year employee hold for this sample.
195 Empirical Results
5.1 Empirical Model
The empirical model that will be used to test for real wage cyclicality is a classic
human-capital wage equation with a control for business cycle conditions. The
static form of the model is:
Wit = ￿i + ￿1t + ￿2t2 + ￿3Ut￿1 + ￿4Zi + ￿5Xit + ￿6X2
it + "it;
i = 1;:::;N; t = 1;:::;T (2)
where Wit is the natural log of the real wage of individual i in time t, Ut￿1 is the
aggregate unemployment rate in period t ￿ 1, t and t2 are a time trend and its
square, Xit is a vector of time-varying worker characteristics such as experience
and its square (X2
it), Zi is a vector of time-invariant worker characteristics such
as education, ￿i is a vector of unobserved individual-speci￿c characteristics that
are ￿xed over time and "it is a zero-mean random term with constant variance.
If ￿i is correlated with the regressors, estimating (2) by ordinary least
squares (OLS) would yield biased estimates of the ￿￿ s parameters. Whenever
possible, a ￿xed e⁄ects estimator (within-group estimator) will be used in order
to deal with this potential problem (and, thus, estimate consistently the model
parameters). In this case, OLS is applied to the following transformed model of
equation (2):
e wit = ￿1e t+￿2e t2+￿3e Ut￿1+￿4 e Xit+￿5 e X2
it+e "it (3)
where e wit;e t;e t2; e Ut￿1; e Xit; e X2
it and e "it are the variables listed in their devia-
tions from individual time-series means. The ￿ coe¢ cients are de￿ned as:
￿1 = ￿1 + ￿51; ￿2 = ￿2; ￿3 = ￿3;￿4 = ￿5j (j = 2;:::;k) and ￿5 = ￿6: The
parameter ￿51 refers to the coe¢ cient on experience and the parameters ￿5j
refer to the coe¢ cients on other time-varying worker characteristics. With this
transformation the disturbance term, e "it, is uncorrelated with the regressors.
In fact, in the ￿xed e⁄ects model, unlike the random e⁄ects model, consistency
of the coe¢ cient estimates may be retained even when the individual-speci￿c
terms are correlated with the regressors.
The parameter ￿3 (￿3) measures the percent wage change in response to a
one-point increase in the unemployment rate. A negative value of ￿3 (￿3) implies
that wages rise when unemployment diminishes, so that wages are procyclical.
If, on the contrary, ￿3 (￿3) is positive, wages are countercyclical.
Model (2) cannot be applied to the samples of hirings and separations since,
by construction, panel data are not available in these two cases. To deal with
this problem, equation (2) will be estimated by OLS with no control for individ-
ual unobserved heterogeneity. In order to enable the comparison of the results
20obtained for continuously employed workers and workers￿hirings and separa-
tions, the OLS estimates of equation (2) without individual-speci￿c e⁄ects will
also be reported for the former.
5.2 Results
In this Section the main empirical results obtained from the di⁄erent regression
models are presented. In Section 5.2.1 the OLS and ￿xed-e⁄ects regression
results are reported for continuously employed workers. In Section 5.2.2 the
OLS regression estimates are shown for workers￿hirings and separations. All
results are presented separately for men and women.
5.2.1 Continuously Employed Workers
The empirical analysis starts with the study of real wage cyclicality of those
individuals that remained employed over the entire period of 1986-98 (long-term
employee).
In Table 9 the OLS estimates of equation (2) with no individual speci￿c ef-
fects are presented for two di⁄erent speci￿cations (men and women separately).
In both cases the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the average
hourly earnings (AHE) de￿ ated by the CPI (1985 PTE).16 The AHE is ob-
tained by dividing the total regular payroll in the month by the total number
of normal hours worked.17 Speci￿cation (1) includes a constant (CONST), the
unemployment rate (U), a trend (T) and its square (TSQ). Since wages are
set at least six months to one year in advance, there is a delayed relationship
between wages and economic growth. To capture this lagged e⁄ect we use the
unemployment rate of the previous year. Speci￿cation 2 also includes some
controls for workers￿observed heterogeneity. Education (EDUC) refers to the
total number of years of schooling completed.18 Worker￿ s age is used as a proxy
for experience (AGE). Seven dummies that characterize worker￿ s skill are also
added.19 Descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum and max-
imum) of all these variables are provided in Tables A.1 (for men) and A.2 (for
women) of Appendix A.
16Between 1986-93 the price index is calculated from March of year t ￿ 1 to March of year
t, whereas in the 1994-98 period the price index is calculated from October of year t ￿ 1 to
October of year t. Between 1993 and 1994 there is an adjustment of a year and a half because
in 1993 wages refer to March and in 1994 wages refer to October.
17Total regular payroll includes base wages, seniority payments and regular bene￿ts.
18It should be noted that some workers obtained a higher educational level while employed.
19See Table A.1 in Appendix A for a de￿nition of the quali￿cation levels.
21Table 9: OLS Results
Long-term Employee
(Dependent variable: log Average Hourly Earnings)
Men Women
Independent Variables (1) (2) (1) (2)
U -0.98 -1.00 -0.69 -0.75
(-12.6) (-15.9) (-4.3) (-7.1)
T 0.0328 0.0077 0.0309 0.0006*
(31.2) (9.0) (14.1) (0.4)
TSQ 0.0005 0.0012 0.0001* 0.0008






















CONST 5.501 3.685 5.275 3.473
(847.6) (299.1) (389.6) (183.6)
R
2
0.12 0.42 0.06 0.61
Sum of squared residuals 77782.7 51144.0 36647.7 15338.1
Number of Observations 471408 155112
Notes: (i) t-statistics are in parentheses;
(ii) all estimates are signi￿cant at 1%, except those with an *.
22The OLS estimates show evidence of a moderate procyclical behavior of real
wages for both men and women. According to speci￿cation 2 of Table 9, a
1-percentage point decrease in the national unemployment rate raises average
hourly earnings by 1.0 percent for men and by 0.75 percent for women. Con-
trolling for worker observed heterogeneity gives more precise estimates of the
unemployment rate coe¢ cient. The less procyclical behavior of women￿ s real
wages compared to men￿ s real wages is in accordance with previous ￿ndings
shown by Tremblay (1990) and Solon et al. (1994).
Table 10 shows the estimates of the unemployment rate coe¢ cient for spec-
i￿cation 2 using three other wage measures. In column 2 the hourly earnings
including overtime pay (AHEIOT)20 measure is used and in columns 3 and 4 the
hourly base wage (AHBW)21 and the monthly base wage (AMBW) are adopted,
respectively. For comparison reasons the unemployment coe¢ cient estimates for
AHE are reported in column 1.
The inclusion of overtime pay does not change the hourly wage cyclicality of
either men or women. Hourly earnings (AHEIOT) decrease by 1.04 percent and
0.70 percent in response to a one percentage point increase in the unemployment
rate, for men and women, respectively. This result is not surprising since in the
Portuguese labor market overtime hours represent a non-signi￿cant percentage
of total hours worked. In fact, for the period 1986-98, overtime work for ￿rms
employing paid labor corresponds, on average, to 0.9% of the total number of
hours worked.
Comparing the ￿gures obtained for the estimates of the unemployment co-
e¢ cient using an hourly measure (AHBW) or instead, a monthly measure
(AMBW), leads us to conclude that hourly wages are more procyclical than
monthly wages. According to Table 10, a one percentage point decrease in the
unemployment rate raises average hourly base wages of male (female) workers
by 1.10% (1.08%) and average monthly base wages by only 0.74% (0.28%). This
result appears to suggest that, if anything, normal hours worked tend to behave
in a slightly countercyclical fashion.22
20The AHEIOT is de￿ned as the ratio between total regular payroll including overtime pay
and the sum of normal and extra hours of work.
21The AHBW is de￿ned as the ratio between the monthly base wage and the total number
of normal hours worked in the month.
22This somewhat unexpected behavior in usual hours of work may be justi￿ed by the fact
that the period under analysis (mainly an expansionary period) is characterized by a gradual
reduction in the average duration of work that reached its peaks in 1991 and 1997 (see INE -
Employment Survey). In fact, in 1991 a reduction in the normal period of work from 48 to 44
hours per week was legally imposed and in 1996 a further reduction from 44 to 40 hours per
week was implemented. This may justify why hourly wages over that period display a more
procyclical behavior than wages per employee.




AHE AHEIOT AHBW AMBW
Men
Cycle Regressor (U) -1.00 -1.04 -1.10 -0.74
(-15.9) (-16.3) (-21.0) (-15.2)
Women
Cycle Regressor (U) -0.75 -0.70 -1.08 -0.28
(-7.1) (-6.6) (-11.9) (-3.4)
Notes: (i) t-statistics are in parentheses;
(ii) all estimates are signi￿cant at 1%.
In Tables 11 and 12 the same regression results are presented for the sub-
sample of job stayers.23 The results reported for male and female job stayers
exhibit a slightly more procyclical behavior of wages in contrast with previous
empirical ￿ndings of a higher procyclicality of real wages for job changers [see,
for example, Bils (1985) and Shin (1994)]. Once again, the results reveal that
monthly wages are less procyclical than hourly wages (see Table 12).
23Tables A.3 (for men) and A.4 (for women) in Appendix A contain the descriptive statistics
for these samples of workers.
24Table 11: OLS Results
Long-term Employee/Job Stayers
(Dependent variable: log Average Hourly Earnings)
Men Women
Independent Variables (1) (2) (1) (2)
U -1.11 -1.20 -0.79 -0.85
(-11.5) (-15.8) (-4.0) (-6.7)
T 0.0272 0.0033 0.0280 -0.00008*
(20.8) (3.2) (10.4) (-0.0)
TSQ 0.0009 0.0016 0.0003* 0.0009






















CONST 5.482 3.771 5.280 3.583
(678.8) (250.2) (318.4) (155.2)
R
2
0.12 0.46 0.06 0.62
Sum of squared residuals 44246.4 27260.9 24459.4 9991.6
Number of Observations 285708 103476
Notes: (i) t-statistics are in parentheses;
(ii) all estimates are signi￿cant at 1%, except those with an *.




AHE AHEIOT AHBW AMBW
Men
Cycle Regressor (U) -1.20 -1.23 -1.23 -0.83
(-15.8) (-16.0) (-19.2) (-13.5)
Women
Cycle Regressor (U) -0.85 -0.82 -1.16 -0.39
(-6.7) (-6.4) (-10.4) (-3.8)
Notes: (i) t-statistics are in parentheses;
(ii) all estimates are signi￿cant at 1%.
The results obtained from the sample of long-term employee should be in-
terpreted with caution, due to the potential problem of selection bias. In fact,
a sample selection bias may arise when only employed workers are followed over
the cycle. The bias may arise if those workers who move in and out of the
workforce over the cycle have (un)observed characteristics systematically di⁄er-
ent from those who stay in. Beyond that, the population represented by this
sample may experience di⁄erent wage cyclicality than what is experienced by
other groups in the labor force, namely those with more unstable labor market
attachments.
In order to avoid these problems, an identical empirical analysis will be
made for the sample of workers employed for two consecutive years (two-year
employee).24 Tables 13 and 14 present the OLS results for both men and women.
For male workers, an unemployment coe¢ cient estimate of -1.16 was obtained
for speci￿cation 2 (see column 2 of Table 13), indicating a more procyclical
behavior of men￿ s real wages when compared to the unemployment rate estimate
obtained for the sample of long-term employee (-1.00). For women, the results
for the sample of two-year employee reveal a less procyclical behavior of real
wages. An unemployment coe¢ cient estimate of -0.45 (see column 4 of Table 13)
was obtained against a value of -0.75 for long-term employees. When alternative
wage measures are used this same pattern of results holds for both men and
women (see Table 14).
Concerning the estimates obtained for the regression coe¢ cients of the other
explanatory variables, the estimation results reveal that, in general, quali￿cation
levels a⁄ect wages more signi￿cantly for the sample of two-year employee than
for the sample of long-term employee. For men, the e⁄ect of age is higher
for the sample of long-term employee whereas for education the e⁄ect is more
pronounced for the sample of two-year employee. For women the e⁄ect of age
and education on wage determination is more pronounced for the sample of
long-term employee than for the sample of two-year employee.
24Tables A.5 (for men) and A.6 (for women) in Appendix A provide the descriptive statistics
for these samples of workers.
26Table 13: OLS Results
Two-year Employee
(Dependent variable: log Average Hourly Earnings)
Men Women
Independent Variables (1) (2) (1) (2)
U -1.38 -1.16 -0.13* -0.45
(-8.3) (-9.7) (-0.7) (-3.3)
T 0.0322 0.0234 0.0294 0.0152
(12.7) (12.7) (10.2) (7.4)
TSQ -0.0002* -0.0004 0.00005* -0.0001*






















CONST 5.374 3.581 5.024 3.728
(349.9) (229.9) (285.6) (212.7)
R
2
0.05 0.50 0.06 0.51
Sum of squared residuals 43732.6 23026.2 21699.1 11082.9
Number of Observations 170414 101750
Notes: (i) t-statistics are in parentheses;
(ii) all estimates are signi￿cant at 1%, except those with an *.




AHE AHEIOT AHBW AMBW
Men
Cycle Regressor (U) -1.16 -1.18 -1.03 -0.58
(-9.7) (-9.7) (-10.0) (-5.2)
Women
Cycle Regressor (U) -0.45 -0.41 -0.67 -0.32*
(-3.3) (-3.0) (-5.5) (-2.2)
Notes: (i) t-statistics are in parentheses;
(ii) all estimates are signi￿cant at 1%, except those with an *.
Finally, in order to account for unobserved individual heterogeneity, equation
(2) was re-estimated using a ￿xed e⁄ects regression model. The results for
both data sets and for speci￿cation 2 are reported in Table 15. The ￿xed
e⁄ects estimates of the unemployment rate coe¢ cient obtained for the sample
of long-term employee are identical to those obtained for this sample of workers
using OLS. The main di⁄erence is the precision of the regression coe¢ cients
as indicated by the t-statistics, which is visibly higher for the estimation with
individual ￿xed e⁄ects.25 As would be expected, the e⁄ects on wages of those
variables that account for observed worker heterogeneity are estimated with
some trepidation when the ￿xed e⁄ects estimator is used. In fact, in the presence
of a ￿xed e⁄ects model, those variables that control for worker heterogeneity
are only taken into account whenever a within-individual change occurs, which
may magnify the bias induced by measurement error in such variables.
Regarding the sample of two-year employee the OLS and ￿xed e⁄ects esti-
mates diverge considerably in magnitude and precision. For men, the unem-
ployment rate estimate is -0.45, whereas for women this same coe¢ cient is not
statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero (see columns 2 and 4 of Table 15).
In a nutshell, the ￿xed e⁄ects results showed a procyclical behavior of real
hourly wages for men, whereas for women the results are not conclusive. The
OLS results exhibited a strongly procyclical behavior of men￿ s real hourly wages
(including job stayers) and a moderate procyclical behavior of women￿ s real
hourly wages.
The comparison of the OLS with the ￿xed e⁄ects regression results for these
two samples seems to suggest that unobserved heterogeneity plays a non-trivial
role in the cyclicality of wages. Leaving aside cross-sectional heterogeneity is
relevant for the sample of two-year employee, but not in the case of the long-
term employee. We tentatively speculate that unobserved heterogeneity tends
to a⁄ect the composition of the workforce in a way that magni￿es the cyclicality
of real wages.
25The same is true for the sub-sample of job stayers. Results available upon request.
28Table 15: Fixed E⁄ects Results
(Dependent variable: log Average Hourly Earnings)
Men Women
Long-term Two-year Long-term Two-year
Independent Variables Employee Employee Employee Employee
U -0.98 -0.45 -0.71 -0.04*
(-34.5) (-4.6) (-15.5) (-0.3)
T 0.0510 0.0340 0.0394 0.0210
(105.1) (21.8) (51.5) (10.8)
TSQ 0.0008 -0.0001* 0.0004 0.0004
(24.6) (-0.5) (7.4) (2.6)
AGESQ -0.0003 0.00005 -0.0002 0.00007
(-69.8) (11.2) (-25.5) (11.3)
EDUC 0.0076 0.0462 0.0130 0.0370
(18.7) (67.0) (19.8) (42.1)
Quali￿cation Level
Q1 0.2546 0.3824 0.3363 0.3317
(55.0) (41.3) (44.9) (24.6)
Q2 0.1665 0.3397 0.1880 0.2540
(45.4) (40.9) (31.9) (22.7)
Q3 0.1230 0.2606 0.1808 0.2328
(39.1) (37.5) (34.9) (21.4)
Q4 0.0992 0.2352 0.1149 0.2413
(31.4) (35.2) (24.0) (29.3)
Q5 0.0490 0.1286 0.0450 0.1122
(17.3) (26.7) (11.0) (23.1)
Q6 0.0416 0.0902 0.0246 0.0702
(14.0) (16.9) (5.8) (13.6)
Q7 0.0308 0.0366 -0.0009* 0.0547
(9.3) (6.3) (-0.2) (8.2)
R
2
0.88 0.88 0.93 0.88
Sum of squared residuals 9601.5 2939.4 2677.2 1511.7
Number of Observations 471408 170414 155112 101750
Notes: (i) t-statistics are in parentheses;
(ii) all estimates are signi￿cant at 1%, except those with an *.
295.2.2 Workers￿Accessions and Separations
In this Section we examine real wage cyclicality for workers￿hiring and sepa-
rations. Previous research on real wage cyclicality has been investigating the
heterogeneity in real wage behavior for workers with a di⁄erent mobility status,
namely job changers and job stayers. However, the issue of heterogeneity for
workers￿accessions and separations has not yet been explored in the literature.
One of the purposes of this study is to investigate how external labor market
conditions a⁄ect a worker￿ s wage at the moment of hiring and separation. This
analysis will enable us to identify the cycle consequences (in terms of wages) for
those workes who search for a new job (wage o⁄ers) and for those workers who
left (voluntary or involuntarily) a job (wage losses). Are real wages sensitive
to the conditions prevailing in the labor market when a hiring or separation
occurs?
In Tables 16 and 17 the OLS estimates for newly hired workers are presented
separately for both men and women.26 As mentioned in Section 4.2, the design of
the sample is cross-sectional, making the use of panel data estimators unfeasible.
The overall results indicate a strongly procyclical behavior of real wages of
newly hired workers, regardless of considering the sample of men or women
or the wage measure being used. According to speci￿cation 2 of Table 16, an
unemployment rate coe¢ cient of -2.08 was obtained for men and a slightly less
procyclical one of -1.78 for women. These values are considerably higher than
those obtained for continuously employed workers, in particular, for job stayers.
The estimates of Table 16 also show the importance of quali￿cations in
wage determination for this sample of workers when compared to continuously
employed workers. The e⁄ects of education and age on wages are not as strong
as for continuously employed workers.
These results suggest that in booms newly hired workers gain access to jobs
that pay higher wages. Some alternative explanations have been advanced in
order to explain why new hires have more procyclical wages. The more frequent
relies on the existence of interindustry wage di⁄erentials. This interpretation
was ￿rst advanced by Okun (1973), who argued that certain jobs o⁄er rents to
workers. If these sectors are also more cyclically sensitive, workers can switch
into high-paying jobs during booms because such jobs are less tightly rationed
during these times. The problem with this explanation is that many of the
workers who change jobs in booms leave these jobs in subsequent recessions.
Moreover, Okun did not explain what the sources of interindustry wage di⁄er-
entials are.
Recently, Barlevy (2001) o⁄ered a new explanation for the existence of more
procyclical wages of job changers: compensating di⁄erentials. In order to show
that compensating di⁄erentials instead of interindustry wage di⁄erentials gen-
erate a more procyclical behavior of wages of changers, Barlevy developed a
model that relates unemployment insurance and wage cyclicality. His empirical
￿nding of a negative relationship between wage cyclicality among job changers
26In Tables A.7 (for men) and A.8 (for women) of Appendix A the descriptive statistics of
all variables are provided for this dataset.
30and the level of unemployment insurance bene￿ts, supports the view that job
changers￿wages are more procyclical because in booms they obtained jobs that
pay a compensating di⁄erential for the risk of layo⁄. In this case, workers who
change jobs during booms may not realize true gains from the higher wages they
receive, since these gains are typically o⁄set during recessions.
Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) advanced a more convincing explanation for
the di⁄erences in wage cyclicality between job stayers and job changers, even
though their explanation abstracts from heterogeneity across jobs. According to
their ￿ndings, current unemployment rate does not a⁄ect wages after controlling
for the best labor market conditions, since a worker was hired at his/her current
job. Indeed, when workers are not mobile between employers, current labor
market conditions do not a⁄ect current wages. In this case, current wages are
negatively correlated with the unemployment rate at the time each worker was
hired. However, if workers are very mobile, wages are correlated with the best
labor market conditions observed since the worker was hired.
Arozamena and Centeno (2001) present a model that combines job matching
and business cycle e⁄ects and argue that as the employment relationship pro-
gresses and speci￿c human capital is accumulated, the worker, by receiving a
fraction of the return to that human capital, is gradually insulated from cyclical
variations in the external labor market. They found robust empirical evidence
supporting this prediction: the elasticity of wages to the unemployment rate
decreases with tenure.
The results obtained for the sample of newly hired workers (accessions) seem
to be more consistent with these last two explanations. Newly hired workers
have more procyclical wages because they hold more unstable job matches with
no access to insurance, being subject to the aggregate conditions that prevail
in the labor market at the time they start a new job. It is noteworthy that in
Portugal, as shown by Varejªo and Portugal (2001), accessions and separations
occur predominantly in the group of workers with temporary contracts. Ac-
cording to their ￿ndings, between 1991 and 1998, ￿xed-term contracts account
for 62% of all accessions and 43% of all separations.
31Table 16: OLS Results
Accessions
(Dependent variable: log Average Hourly Earnings)
Men Women
Independent Variables (1) (2) (1) (2)
U -2.15 -2.08 -1.72 -1.78
(-13.3) (-16.1) (-9.6) (-12.6)
T 0.0220 0.0171 0.0186 0.0133
(10.2) (9.9) (7.8) (7.1)
TSQ 0.0010 0.0005 0.0012 0.0006






















CONST 5.130 4.160 4.942 4.122
(381.9) (274.6) (331.5) (305.0)
R
2
0.10 0.42 0.10 0.44
Sum of squared residuals 19897.7 12790.7 10529.1 6536.3
Number of Observations 115009 72662
Notes: (i) t-statistics are in parentheses;
(ii) all estimates are signi￿cant at 1%.




AHE AHEIOT AHBW AMBW
Men
Cycle Regressor (U) -2.08 -2.08 -2.11 -2.14
(-16.1) (-16.1) (-19.2) (-15.6)
Women
Cycle Regressor (U) -1.78 -1.78 -1.79 -1.46
(-12.6) (-12.6) (-14.1) (-9.0)
Notes: (i) t-statistics are in parentheses;
(ii) all estimates are signi￿cant at 1%.
Tables 18 and 19 report the same regression results for the sample of re-
cently separated workers (men and women).27 Once again, the estimates of the
unemployment rate coe¢ cient exhibit a procyclical behavior of average hourly
earnings. A 1-percentage point increase in the unemployment rate decreases av-
erage hourly earnings by 0.6% for men and by about 1.0% for women. Two facts
emerge from these results. The ￿rst is the existence of a more pronounced cycli-
cal behavior of wages for female separations than for continuously employed
females. This ￿gure of 1.0% can be compared to that of 0.45% for women
employed for two consecutive years. The second is, in contrast with previous
results, the existence of a greater cyclical wage sensitivity for female separations
than for male separations.
Both pieces of evidence are likely to be produced by the heterogeneity in
the composition of the pool of separations of men and women. The pool of
separations may include workers with a low tenure as, for example, those with
a ￿xed-term contract, and may include workers with a higher tenure as, for
instance, workers close to retirement. In other situations, separations may be
produced by the displacement of workers due to collective dismissals or the
shutdown of the plant. In such cases, wage concession mechanisms may be at
work.
Low-tenure workers, mostly women, account for a disproportionate share
of worker turnover. In fact, in the sample a half of the total separations is
produced by workers with three or fewer years of tenure. If we exclude from
the separation sample those workers with more than three years of tenure we
obtain a higher unemployment regression coe¢ cient (-1.2% for both men and
women). Or in another way, 33 percent of the separations are also classi￿ed as
accessions over the one year interval. If we excise these workers from the sample
we would obtain much lower unemployment regression coe¢ cients (0.42% for
men and 0.69% for women).
27In Tables A.9 (for men) and A.10 (for women) of Appendix A the descriptive statistics of
all variables are provided for this data set.
33Table 18: OLS Results
Separations
(Dependent variable: log Average Hourly Earnings)
Men Women
Independent Variables (1) (2) (1) (2)
U -0.37* -0.60 -0.72* -1.02
(-1.4) (-2.8) (-2.5) (-4.4)
T 0.0517 0.0409 0.0259 0.0205
(12.5) (12.8) (5.8) (5.8)
TSQ -0.0018 -0.0018 0.0002* -0.0003*






















CONST 5.093 3.919 4.969 4.036
(218.7) (176.6) (196.2) (162.6)
R
2
0.06 0.44 0.05 0.42
Sum of squared residuals 20952.5 12574.8 10469.5 6388.9
Number of Observations 88894 56979
Notes: (i) t-statistics are in parentheses;
(ii) all estimates are signi￿cant at 1%, except those with an *.




AHE AHEIOT AHBW AMBW
Men
Cycle Regressor (U) -0.60 -0.58 -0.53 -0.38*
(-2.8) (-2.7) (-2.9) (-1.8)
Women
Cycle Regressor (U) -1.02 -0.96 -0.98 -0.81
(-4.4) (-4.1) (-4.7) (-3.1)
Notes: (i) t-statistics are in parentheses;
(ii) all estimates are signi￿cant at 1%, except those with an *.
356 Conclusion
The aim of this study is to provide further evidence on real wage cyclicality using
Portuguese data for the period 1986-98, addressing the issue of heterogeneity in
wages responses to aggregate labor market conditions for workers￿hirings and
separations.
The empirical evidence gathered in this exercise is fourfold. First, there is
an indication of a moderate procyclical behavior of real wages for continuously
employed workers, in particular, for job stayers. This pattern holds for di⁄erent
measures of wages used and speci￿cations. Second, the comparison of the OLS
with the ￿xed-e⁄ects regression results suggests that unobserved heterogeneity
plays a non-trivial role in the cyclicality of wages in a way that magni￿es the
cyclicality of real wages.
Third, the examination of real wage cyclicality of workers￿accessions revealed
a strong procyclical behavior of wages for this type of worker. This empirical ev-
idence is in accordance with the idea that entry wages are much more procyclical
than current wages, which con￿rms previous empirical research consistent with
the hypothesis of implicit shielding agreements between employers and workers
in wage determination [Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) and Arozamena and Cen-
teno (2001)]. Four, whereas in the case of accessions the evidence of cyclicality is
very strong, for the case of separations a number of con￿ icting forces seem to be
at work. Here it is worth emphasizing that a non-trivial portion of separations
are made-up of recent hirings. This particular composition of the separation
pool tends to amplify the cyclicality of the wages of separated workers.
In sum, the empirical evidence suggests that even micro-data estimates of
real wage cyclicality may conceal a strong procyclical wage behavior, when
heterogeneity on wages responses to aggregate conditions between employed
workers and hirings and separations is not taken into account.
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39APPENDIX A - Descriptive Statistics
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics (1986-98)
Long-term Employee/Men
MEAN STDV MIN MAX
Variables
Unemployment Rate (U) 6.34 1.45 4.1 8.5
Trend (T) 6.17 3.85 0.0 12.0
Age (AGE) 42.00 8.08 18.0 64.0
Education (EDUC) 5.59 2.73 0.0 16.0
Quali￿cation Level
Manager and Highly Professional (Q1) 0.015 0.0 1.0
Professional (Q2) 0.028 0.0 1.0
Supervisors (Q3) 0.097 0.0 1.0
Highly Skilled (Q4) 0.066 0.0 1.0
Skilled (Q5) 0.572 0.0 1.0
Semi-skilled (Q6) 0.171 0.0 1.0
Unskilled (Q7) 0.042 0.0 1.0
Apprentices (Q8) 0.008 0.0 1.0
Average Hourly Earnings (AHE) 5.669 0.43 4.35 7.18
Number of Observations 471408
Average Hourly Earnings inc OT (AHEIOT) 5.681 0.44 4.35 7.18
Avearge Hourly Base Wages (AHBW) 5.454 0.37 4.32 6.84
Average Monthly Base Wages (AMBW) 10.606 0.33 8.99 11.74
40Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics (1986-98)
Long-term Employee/Women
MEAN STDV MIN MAX
Variables
Unemployment Rate (U) 6.34 1.45 4.1 8.5
Trend (T) 6.17 3.85 0.0 12.0
Age (AGE) 39.34 7.86 18.0 64.0
Education (EDUC) 6.20 3.04 0.0 16.0
Quali￿cation Level
Manager and Highly Professional (Q1) 0.010 0.0 1.0
Professional (Q2) 0.022 0.0 1.0
Supervisors (Q3) 0.045 0.0 1.0
Highly Skilled (Q4) 0.073 0.0 1.0
Skilled (Q5) 0.438 0.0 1.0
Semi-skilled (Q6) 0.321 0.0 1.0
Unskilled (Q7) 0.081 0.0 1.0
Apprentices (Q8) 0.011 0.0 1.0
Average Hourly Earnings (AHE) 5.431 0.50 4.35 7.17
Number of Observations 155112
Average Hourly Earnings inc OT (AHEIOT) 5.434 0.50 4.35 7.18
Average Hourly Base Wages (AHBW) 5.282 0.45 4.34 6.82
Averahe Monthly Base Wages (AMBW) 10.404 0.40 8.99 11.71
41Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics (1986-98)
Long-term Employee/Men Job Stayers
MEAN STDV MIN MAX
Variables
Unemployment Rate (U) 6.34 1.45 4.1 8.5
Trend (T) 6.17 3.85 0.0 12.0
Age (AGE) 42.59 8.15 18.0 64.0
Education (EDUC) 5.41 2.57 0.0 16.0
Quali￿cation Level
Manager and Highly Professional (Q1) 0.011 0.0 1.0
Professional (Q2) 0.030 0.0 1.0
Supervisors (Q3) 0.106 0.0 1.0
Highly Skilled (Q4) 0.065 0.0 1.0
Skilled (Q5) 0.573 0.0 1.0
Semi-skilled (Q6) 0.162 0.0 1.0
Unskilled (Q7) 0.046 0.0 1.0
Apprentices (Q8) 0.007 0.0 1.0
Average Hourly Earnings (AHE) 5.630 0.42 4.35 7.18
Number of Observations 285708
Average Hourly Earnings inc OT (AHEIOT) 5.643 0.43 4.35 7.18
Average Hourly Base Wages (AHBW) 5.423 0.37 4.32 6.84
Average Monthly Base Wages (AMBW) 10.587 0.33 8.99 11.74
42Table A.4: Descriptive Statistics (1986-98)
Long-term Employee/Women Job Stayers
MEAN STDV MIN MAX
Variables
Unemployment Rate (U) 6.34 1.45 4.1 8.5
Trend (T) 6.17 3.85 0.0 12.0
Age (AGE) 39.68 7.96 18.0 64.0
Education (EDUC) 6.11 3.01 0.0 16.0
Quali￿cation Level
Manager and Highly Professional (Q1) 0.009 0.0 1.0
Professional (Q2) 0.024 0.0 1.0
Supervisors (Q3) 0.042 0.0 1.0
Highly Skilled (Q4) 0.068 0.0 1.0
Skilled (Q5) 0.415 0.0 1.0
Semi-skilled (Q6) 0.341 0.0 1.0
Unskilled (Q7) 0.091 0.0 1.0
Apprentices (Q8) 0.010 0.0 1.0
Average Hourly Base Earnings (AHE) 5.421 0.50 4.36 7.16
Number of Observations 103476
Average Hourly Earnings inc OT (AHEIOT) 5.424 0.50 4.36 7.18
Average Hourly Base Wages (AHBW) 5.273 0.45 4.35 6.82
Average Monthly Base Wages (AMBW) 10.400 0.40 8.99 11.71
43Table A.5: Descriptive Statistics (1986-98)
Two-year Employee/Men
MEAN STDV MIN MAX
Variables
Unemployment Rate (U) 6.39 1.45 4.1 8.5
Trend (T) 6.39 3.75 0.0 12.0
Age (AGE) 38.0 11.14 18.0 64.0
Education (EDUC) 5.99 3.06 0.0 16.0
Quali￿cation Level
Manager and Highly Professional (Q1) 0.030 0.0 1.0
Professional (Q2) 0.029 0.0 1.0
Supervisors (Q3) 0.066 0.0 1.0
Highly Skilled (Q4) 0.061 0.0 1.0
Skilled (Q5) 0.529 0.0 1.0
Semi-skilled (Q6) 0.151 0.0 1.0
Unskilled (Q7) 0.089 0.0 1.0
Apprentices (Q8) 0.045 0.0 1.0
Average Hourly Earnings (AHE) 5.483 0.52 4.10 7.46
Number of Observations 170414
Average Hourly Earnings inc OT (AHEIOT) 5.490 0.53 4.10 7.94
Avearge Hourly Base Wages (AHBW) 5.345 0.46 2.60 7.45
Average Monthly Base Wages (AMBW) 10.489 0.47 6.11 12.65
44Table A.6: Descriptive Statistics (1986-98)
Two-year Employee/Women
MEAN STDV MIN MAX
Variables
Unemployment Rate (U) 6.39 1.41 4.1 8.5
Trend (T) 6.81 3.69 0.0 12.0
Age (AGE) 34.45 10.10 18.0 64.0
Education (EDUC) 6.33 3.11 0.0 16.0
Quali￿cation Level
Manager and Highly Professional (Q1) 0.014 0.0 1.0
Professional (Q2) 0.017 0.0 1.0
Supervisors (Q3) 0.023 0.0 1.0
Highly Skilled (Q4) 0.050 0.0 1.0
Skilled (Q5) 0.415 0.0 1.0
Semi-skilled (Q6) 0.296 0.0 1.0
Unskilled (Q7) 0.116 0.0 1.0
Apprentices (Q8) 0.070 0.0 1.0
Average Hourly Earnings (AHE) 5.220 0.48 4.12 7.44
Number of Observations 101750
Average Hourly Earnings inc OT (AHEIOT) 5.222 0.48 4.12 7.48
Avearge Hourly Base Wages (AHBW) 5.128 0.44 3.09 7.42
Average Monthly Base Wages (AMBW) 10.235 0.47 6.01 12.64
45Table A.7: Descriptive Statistics (1986-98)
Accessions/Men
MEAN STDV MIN MAX
Variables
Unemployment Rate (U) 6.40 1.44 4.1 8.5
Trend (T) 6.13 3.91 0.0 12.0
Age (AGE) 30.91 10.08 18.0 64.0
Education (EDUC) 6.11 3.00 0.0 16.0
Quali￿cation Level
Manager and Highly Professional (Q1) 0.020 0.0 1.0
Professional (Q2) 0.017 0.0 1.0
Supervisors (Q3) 0.025 0.0 1.0
Highly Skilled (Q4) 0.027 0.0 1.0
Skilled (Q5) 0.460 0.0 1.0
Semi-skilled (Q6) 0.128 0.0 1.0
Unskilled (Q7) 0.195 0.0 1.0
Apprentices (Q8) 0.128 0.0 1.0
Average Hourly Earnings (AHE) 5.188 0.44 3.90 7.36
Number of Observations 115009
Average Hourly Earnings inc OT (AHEIOT) 5.192 0.44 3.90 7.37
Avearge Hourly Base Wages (AHBW) 5.092 0.39 3.87 7.23
Average Monthly Base Wages (AMBW) 10.205 0.44 7.95 12.29
46Table A.8: Descriptive Statistics (1986-98)
Accessions/Women
MEAN STDV MIN MAX
Variables
Unemployment Rate (U) 6.35 1.39 4.1 8.5
Trend (T) 6.72 3.84 0.0 12.0
Age (AGE) 29.34 9.11 18.0 64.0
Education (EDUC) 6.71 3.17 0.0 16.0
Quali￿cation Level
Manager and Highly Professional (Q1) 0.012 0.0 1.0
Professional (Q2) 0.014 0.0 1.0
Supervisors (Q3) 0.010 0.0 1.0
Highly Skilled (Q4) 0.032 0.0 1.0
Skilled (Q5) 0.309 0.0 1.0
Semi-skilled (Q6) 0.212 0.0 1.0
Unskilled (Q7) 0.188 0.0 1.0
Apprentices (Q8) 0.224 0.0 1.0
Average Hourly Earnings (AHE) 5.036 0.40 3.88 7.37
Number of Observations 72662
Average Hourly Earnings inc OT (AHEIOT) 5.038 0.40 3.88 7.37
Average Hourly Base Wages (AHBW) 4.970 0.37 3.88 7.22
Average Monthly Base Wages (AMBW) 10.037 0.42 7.92 12.30
47Table A.9: Descriptive Statistics (1986-97)
Separations/Men
MEAN STDV MIN MAX
Variables
Unemployment Rate (U) 6.45 1.56 4.1 8.5
Trend (T) 5.88 3.72 0.0 11.0
Age (AGE) 35.38 12.14 18.0 64.0
Education (EDUC) 5.73 2.88 0.0 16.0
Quali￿cation Level
Manager and Highly Professional (Q1) 0.024 0.0 1.0
Professional (Q2) 0.022 0.0 1.0
Supervisors (Q3) 0.049 0.0 1.0
Highly Skilled (Q4) 0.039 0.0 1.0
Skilled (Q5) 0.497 0.0 1.0
Semi-skilled (Q6) 0.141 0.0 1.0
Unskilled (Q7) 0.138 0.0 1.0
Apprentices (Q8) 0.090 0.0 1.0
Average Hourly Earnings (AHE) 5.287 0.50 3.88 7.52
Number of Observations 88894
Average Hourly Earnings inc OT (AHEIOT) 5.290 0.50 3.88 7.52
Average Hourly Base Wages (AHBW) 5.183 0.45 3.87 7.41
Average Monthly Base Wages (AMBW) 10.299 0.48 7.93 12.43
48Table A.10: Descriptive Statistics (1986-97)
Separations/Women
MEAN STDV MIN MAX
Variables
Unemployment Rate (U) 6.37 1.52 4.1 8.5
Trend (T) 6.32 3.62 0.0 11.0
Age (AGE) 33.09 10.65 18.0 64.0
Education (EDUC) 6.17 3.05 0.0 16.0
Quali￿cation Level
Manager and Highly Professional (Q1) 0.011 0.0 1.0
Professional (Q2) 0.015 0.0 1.0
Supervisors (Q3) 0.018 0.0 1.0
Highly Skilled (Q4) 0.040 0.0 1.0
Skilled (Q5) 0.368 0.0 1.0
Semi-skilled (Q6) 0.271 0.0 1.0
Unskilled (Q7) 0.148 0.0 1.0
Apprentices (Q8) 0.130 0.0 1.0
Average Hourly Earnings (AHE) 5.097 0.44 3.89 7.49
Number of Observations 56979
Average Hourly Earnings inc OT (AHEIOT) 5.099 0.44 3.89 7.49
Average Hourly Base Wages (AHBW) 5.026 0.41 3.87 7.40
Average Monthly Base Wages (AMBW) 10.103 0.46 7.91 12.40
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